Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization.
Úplná charakteristika triedy korešpondencií sociálneho výberu, ktoré sú implementovateľné pri silnej Nashovej rovnováhe. Na rozdiel od starších prác sa namiesto funkcií efektivity používa variant hry v kontexte s Nashovou implementáciou.
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| Format: | Book Chapter |
| Language: | English |
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