Delegation of a monetary policy to a central banker with private information
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Autres auteurs: | |
| Format: | Livre |
| Langue: | anglais |
| Publié: |
San Domenico (FI)
European University Institute
1998
|
| Collection: | EUI Working paper ECO
No. 98/34 |
| Sujets: | |
| Tags: |
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
Documents similaires: Delegation of a monetary policy to a central banker with private information
- Delegation and coordination in fiscal-monetary policy games implemantation of the best feasible equilibrium
- Optimal Monetary Policy and Disclosure With an Informationally-Constrained Central Banker
- Day-to-day monetary policy and the volatility of the Federal funds interest rate
- Wage formation and monetary policy rules
- Monetary policy and central banking in view of Alan Greenspan
- Selected issues concerning monetary policy and inštitutional design for central banks <a> review of theories