Delegation of a monetary policy to a central banker with private information
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| Natura: | Libro |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
San Domenico (FI)
European University Institute
1998
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| Serie: | EUI Working paper ECO
No. 98/34 |
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